Sunday, 13 March 2011

Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Clarendon Paperbacks)



Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Clarendon Paperbacks)
Brian Bix | 1996-01-04 00:00:00 | Oxford University Press, USA | 232 | Reference
This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law--the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of "open texture," Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Reviews
How do we follow rules? Is there an unique interpretation to a legal prescription, or language is dubious by nature? This questions are largely discussed in the later work of Brian Bix. In his oeuvre professor Bix confronts some of the most prominent authors of contemporary legal theory and philosophy of language as well. Varying from H.L.A. Hart's "open texture" to Ronald Dworkin's "legal answer thesis", the philosophy subjacent to the legal debate is exposed and revisited. Starting from the radical indeterminacy thesis, professor Bix discuss the (mis)interpretations of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox (cf. "Philosophical Investigations", paragraph 201). Professor Bix argues that Wittgenstein conceptions about rule-following refer only to the "clear cases", i.e., cases which following the rule is reputed self-evident. That is to say: the rule-following thesis is worth only when one do not think before obeying the rule, when there is no "interpretation" in the strong sense of reflection. His point, however, somehow miss the main part of the issue. One possible exegesis of Wittgenstein's secondary philosophy is that all the rules are applied automatically or, at least, we could not determine when one stop to play the "language games". Wittgenstein uses the clear cases just as prototypes, small and simple models for study. Not withstanding the foregoing, professor Bix has exceeded his skills of legal argumentation, bringing forth a strong and well grounded book of jurisprudence.

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