The Concept of Probability in Statistical Physics (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory)

The Concept of Probability in Statistical Physics (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory)
Y. M. Guttmann | 1999-07-13 00:00:00 | Cambridge University Press | 280 | Philosophy
Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing the most systematic study to date of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science.
Reviews
As a specialist on statistical physics and its history, I found this book rather disappointing, misleading and conceptually confused. Be warned that the book is evidently written from a specific perspective of a philosopher who strongly prefers an ontic ("frequentists") interpretation of probability, basically in a spirit of the old Boltzmann-Ehrenfest ideology and its conceptual difficulties. Consequently, Guttmann puts undue emphasis on struggles with ergodicity, coarse-graining, etc., whilst not showing too much sympathy and understanding for epistemically thinking schools of statistical physics (Gibbs, Bohr, Schroedinger, Jaynes, etc.).

One of principal Guttmann's mistakes was his choice of a language he uses for labelling different interpretations of probability. His labelling by the terms "objective" and "subjective" is doomed to failure from the very beginning, and just adds to some old confusions and misunderstandings. In the real-world statistical physics, it is easy to show that the ontic nterpretations of probabilities always possess many "subjective" aspects whilst the epistemic views of probabilities bring some important "objective" aspects. Thus, any finer discussion of different interpretations of probabilities in physics can hardly be rationally based on the naive and misleading "subjective" vs. "objective" labelling.

The book is particularly far from reality when dealing with Edwin T. Jaynes and his information-theoretic interpretation of statistical mechanics. It almost seems that Guttmann's major motivation for writting the book was his obvious hostility to Jaynes' ideas. Guttmann is double-wrong concerning Jaynes: he is wrong about true Jaynes' probabilistic legacy, opinions and interpretations. But he is also confusing the very rationale of statistical physics. It is just paradoxical that Guttmann uses a label "ultra-subjective" for a man who contributed more than anybody after Gibbs to clarify, rationalize and generalize the whole subject of statistical physics. Guttmann is just repeating some old misunderstandings and naive attacks (e.g., by Uhlenbeck, Shimony, Friedman or Seidenfeld) which Jaynes analyzed in details in his many papers. However, these important papers are not even mentioned by Guttmann.

Relatively more successfull, original and interesting appears the Ch. 4, Measure and Topology in Statistical Mechanics.

In summary, Guttmann's book does contain some valuable reference material, and the very topic of the book is extremely important. Unfortunately, Dr. Guttmann did not succeed to elaborate a concise and logical view of the topic, but rather added his own confusions and misunderstandings concerning different conceptual aspects of probability theory in statistical physics. Fundamentally distorted and biased is his treatment of Jaynes' ideas, his interpretation of Gibbs method, and his perception of epistemic probabilities in physics in general.

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